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JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TAXATION
OF REAL PROPERTY SINCE THE ADOPTION
OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION OF 1970
by SHELDON GARDNER*
INTRODUCTION

The problem of valuation and assessment of real property
in Illinois came to a climax with the adoption of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.1 Legal challenges to a system viewed as arbitrary and corrupt have changed the basic approach to assessment.
Underlying much of the litigation in this area, including most
of the major cases cited in this article, was a concept that the
assessors functioned in an arbitrary fashion and, prior to the
new constitution, had been sheltered from attack from the courts.
Indeed, the assessor's office in Cook County had been under
attack by the media for a number of years for alleged favoritism
and corruption. Federal indictments and convictions emanated
from the activities of the assessor's office. It is against this political and historical background that one must see the wave of litigation against the assessors and their valuations.
Since the adoption of the new constitution, the law of real
property assessment has undergone both drastic changes and
unforeseen stagnation. Although many of these changes were
mandated by the Revenue Article, 2 greater change has come
from subsequent court decisions which have interpreted the constitutional language. Although the changes have not completely
resolved the chaotic system that had existed, they have better
defined the rights of the property owner in Illinois. However,
the process which has resulted in this heightened definition of
rights has raised substantial questions which will require further
clarification from either the legislature or the judiciary.
Although commentators had expressed great hopes for innovation by way of the new Revenue Article, 3 in several instances
court decisions interpreting its sections have caused great disappointment. Expanded scope of judicial review in assessment
* Deputy State's Attorney and Chief of the Civil Actions Bureau
of the Office of the State's Attorney of Cook County. The author wishes
to acknowledge the assistance of John Sahn, Senior Law Student.
1. ILL. CONST. (1970). All references to the "constitution" are to
the Constitution of 1970 unless otherwise stated. The effective date of
all relevant sections mentioned herein was July 31, 1971.
2. ILL. CONST. art. IX (1970).
3. For a delegates report on the Revenue Article, see generally
Netsch, Article IX-Revenue, 52 CHICAGO BAR Rzc. 103 (1970).
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proceedings was considered by some to be a certainty under the
new provisions. However, in the first decision examining the
issue, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the framers did not
intend to expand judicial review. The status of available equitable relief of fraudulent assessments is currently in an uncertain
state. Recent supreme court decisions have yielded little in
determining the relationship between statutory forms of relief
and the courts' power to enjoin collection of allegedly excessive
taxes. While the court has stated that equity is available, it has
outlined uncertain guidelines as to when its application can be
sought and granted. It will also be noted that the question of
the availability of equitable relief and judicial review may well
open a federal forum to the disgruntled taxpayer in the near
future.
While the courts have been less than clear in elucidating the
standards of review in these areas, they have acted decisively
in validating the Cook County procedure of de facto classification
of real property for assessment purposes. The constitutional convention had indicated that the new Revenue Article would in
effect ratify this county procedure. However, questions regarding its enactment engendered several suits which challenged the
entire assessment procedure within the county. The supreme
court has answered the challenges in favor of the assessor, and
has preserved the use of the de facto system.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS

To taxpayers and reformers alike the greatest obstacle in the
assessment system was the inability of the taxpayer to effectively
challenge the inaccuracy of the assessment. Since the review
of the Assessor's initial evaluation 4 was limited to review by a
Board of Appeals, 5 the taxpayer could not appeal the proceeding to the judicial system although he might under limited conditions challenge the valuation in court. The Illinois Supreme
Court had interpreted Article IX of the Illinois Constitution of
18706 as prohibiting judicial review. 7 The court characterized
the valuation of real property as a legislative process under the
constitutional mandate that valuation be set by rules or laws
enacted by the General Assembly in a uniform fashion. Thus,
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 120 (1973). See First Lien Co. v. Markle,
31 Ill. 2d 431, 202 N.E.2d 26 (1964).
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 593 et seq. (1973). On review of assessments by Boards of Review in counties with less than 500,000 inhabitants, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 588 (1973).
6. The relevant clause of the 1870 Constitution provided in part that
"[t)he general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful
by levying a tax by valuation. . . ." ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (1870).
7. Bistor v. McDonough, 348 Ill. 624, 181 N.E. 417 (1932).
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if local officials set valuations by uniform procedures, the valuation would not be subject to challenge. However, should the
mandate for uniform treatment be violated by the local assessing official, a judicial challenge would lie.
The basis to the challenge of excessive valuation requires
that the cause be not disagreement as to value, but rather due
to fraud-either real or constructive." Any excessive valuation
caused by fraud would violate the 1870 constitutional requireUnder this interpretation, the
ment of uniform treatment.
Illinois Supreme Court achieved a two-fold objective. First, it
prevented what the court felt could be a flood of cases dealing
with differences of opinion as to valuation. Second, it allowed
a method of judicial review for those cases that were of such a
nature as to require taxpayer protection. Thus, the court established a system where only the most severely injured taxpayers
had a legal remedy.
In People ex rel. Nordlund v. S.B.A. Co.,9 a 1966 case, the
supreme court set forth the problem concisely:
We have consistently held that the taxation of property is a
legislative function rather than a judicial function, and under
Section 1 of Article IX of the Illinois Constitution, the courts
in the absense of fraud, have no power to review or determine
the value of property fixed for purposes of taxation by the
appropriateelected or appointed administrative officers....
We know of no authority, and none has been cited to us,
which suggests that it is a deprivation of due process to attribute
8. In People ex rel. Frantz v. M.D.B.K.W., Inc., 36 Ill. 2d 209, 211,
221 N.E.2d 650, 652 (1966), the Illinois Supreme Court stated the proof
required to establish constructive fraud:
It is only where the property has been grossly overvalued, the assessed valuation being reached under circumstances showing either
lack of knowledge of known values or a deliberate fixing of values
contrary to the known value, that fraud in law will be inferred. Before the conduct of taxing authorities will be considered constructive
fraud, the evidence must clearly establish that the assessment was
made in ignorance of the value of the property, or on a judgment
not based upon readily ascertainable facts, or on a designedly excessive basis.
The grounds for constructive fraud have also been summarized as follows:
(a) Where there is evidence of actual fraud;
(b) Where the evidence indicates the assessment is so excessive
that it could not have been honestly made;
(c) Where the evidence indicates that the assessment was made by
mere will without the exercise of judgment;
(d) Where the evidence indicates the assessment was arbitrairly
made in disregard of recognized elements of value;
(e) Where the evidence indicates the assessment was made in violation of the rules of the Assessor or the Board of Appeals;
and
(f)
Where there is evidence of intentional and systematic discrimination.
Forde, The Litigation of Real Estate Tax Assessments in Cook County,
1972 TRIAL LAWYERS GUIDE 209.
9. 34 Ill. 2d 373, 215 N.E.2d 233 (1966).
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of assessments

10

An analysis of the debates of the Constitutional Convention
indicate that the framers of the new constitution were well
aware of the problems faced by taxpayers wishing to challenge
excessive valuation. The debates on the Revenue Article, though
limited, indicate the concern of certain delegates.
Mrs. Leahy: Does your sentence 'any such classification shall
be reasonable and assessment shall be uniform with any class,'
does that sentence provide the ability for challenges to assessments that do not exist today in Cook County?
Mr. Karns: I would say that it well might, Mrs. Leahy. As I
understand the courts have picked on the expression determined
by some person I believe, as 'the General Assembly shall direct
and not otherwise' as the - one of the reasons for denying
judicial review. That type of provision, you will notice, is not
in here.
Mrs. Leahy: . . . [S]o you would see this sentence as providing
some type of protection from arbitrary and capricious assessments, if such should exist?
Mr. Karns: Yes.
Mr. Gertz: Now, earlier you suggested that judicial review might
be possible. Would you be amenable to inserting some phrase
or clause which would make judicial review more likely in certain circumstances?
Mr. Karns: I would not, personally, because I do not personally
see the need for expanded judicial review. This is my own
opinion in this matter.
Mr. Gertz: Wouldn't judicial review be limited to fraud, and
there might be other circumstances including unreasonable classification.
Mr. Karns: Well, certainly fraud and unreasonable classification and perhaps other circumstances."
These are the only references to the question of judicial
review of real property assessments in the legislative history of
subsections 4 (a) and 4 (b) of Article IX of the 1970 Constitution.
Thus, when the new revenue provision emerged in the constitution, its broad language gave hope of a new approach to the prob12
lem of over-assessment.
10. Id. at 376, 215 N.E.2d at 235 (emphasis added).
11. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
Verbatim Transcripts, vol. III at 2023. [hereinafter cited as Verbatim
Transcripts].
12. The portions of the Revenue Article pertinent to this discussion

are ILL.

CONST.

art. IX, § 4(a) - (c) :

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real
property shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the
General Assembly shall provide by law.
(b) Subject to such limitations as the General Assembly may hereafter prescribe by law, counties with a population of more than
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Both the drafters of the constitution and legal scholars had
great expectations for change. One commentator, Dr. Richard
Wattling, developed a case for change. His thesis was:
The Revenue Article of the 1970 Illinois Constitution has worked,
or more precisely will work, substantial changes in the taxation
of real property in Cook County. .

.

. It expands, substantially,

the legal remedies available to real property owners aggrieved
by the valuations placed upon their properties by the assessing
authorities.13
Based upon his analysis of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention and of the changes in the Revenue Article in
the 1970 Constitution, Wattling concluded that:
[T]he 1970 Constitutional Convention knowingly and deliberately eliminated from the 1970 Constitution any and all restrictions on judicial review of real property assessments...
Accordingly, it would appear that, for the first time in 124 years,
direct judicial review is now possible in Illinois from the valuation decisions of the assessing authorities. More specifically, no
longer is it necessary in a separate proceeding to establish that
the assessment in question was actually or constructively fraudulent .... 14
Many of Wattling's expectations were shared by other real estate
tax experts. 15 The pervading feeling was that judicial review
indeed had been enhanced in scope.
The hopeful expectations of the commentators were never
fulfilled. In M.F.M. Corp. v. Cullerton,16 the Illinois Appellate
Court utilized the "constructive fraud" doctrine in reviewing an
assessment within Cook County. After citing older decisions as
supportive, the court found that the facts did lead to a conclu200,000 may classify or continue to classify real property for purposes of taxation. Any such classification shall be reasonable and
assessments shall be uniform within each class. The level of assessment or rate of tax of the highest class in a county shall not exceed
two and one-half times the level of assessment or rate of tax of the
lowest class in that county. Real property used in farming in a
county shall not be assessed at a higher level of assessment than
single family residential property in that county.
(c) Any depreciation in value of real estate occasioned by a public
easement may be deducted in assessing such property.
13. Wattling, Taxation of Property in Cook County Under the Constitution of 1970, 6 J. MAR. J. 87 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WATTLING].
14. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
15. Wayne W. Whalen, a drafter of the 1970 Constitution, along with
Robert A. Helmon, stated: "Nothing in Section 4 requires continuation
of the doctrine developed by the courts under the 1870 Constitution that
no judicial review is allowed with respect to individual assessments."
ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b), Commentary at 177 (Smith-Hurd 1973).
Kevin M. Forde, one of the leading revenue attorneys in Illinois has also
stated: "The restrictive language of Article IX, Section 1 (of the 1870
Constitution) has been removed in the Constitution of 1970, perhaps
broadening the opportunities for judicial review." Forde, The Litigation
of Real Estate Tax Assessments in Cook County, 1972 T
LAWYERS
GuDE 209, 223.

16. 16 Ill. App. 3d 681, 306 N.E.2d 505 (1973).
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sion of fraud. 17 As fraud was factually indicated by the record,
there was perhaps no need to review other proposed standards
for judicial review made possible by the new Revenue Article.
The court made no effort to inspect floor proceedings of the convention or the legislative history of the article. However, the
use of the constructive fraud standard was soon to be put to
a more genuine challenge.
In LaSalle National Bank v. County of Cook,' 8 the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected arguments for a change of the standard
for judicial review of assessment proceedings. Several corporate
land trustees 9 filed individual and class actions seeking injunctive relief and a refund of taxes allegedly based upon excessive
valuations within Cook County.20 The court discussed the
applicability of the equitable and declaratory relief sought,2 1
and found that the case involved facts not warranting either
form of relief at this stage of the litigation.
Of greater impact was the court's holding that the new constitution did not change the necessity of a finding of constructive fraud as a requisite for judicial review of property tax
assessments. After setting out the relevant provisions of both
the old and the new constitutions, 22 the court found that
"[t]he difference in the language used in the 1970 Constitution
from that used in the 1870 Constitution

. .

.has not altered the

scope of judicial review of real estate tax assessments. ' 23 The

17. Id. Plaintiff's property had been assessed at a figure approximately three times that of the previous year's figure. The record indicated no improvements which would justify the inflated figure placed

upon the property by the assessor.
18. 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252 (1974).
19. The defendants questioned the ability of the land trustees to bring
the actions. The court found it unnecessary to discuss this contention
since the dismissal was upheld on other grounds.
20. Cook County is specifically authorized to divide the territory of
the county into four parts. Each quadrant is reassessed every four years.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 524 (1973). The validity of this enabling statute
was upheld in Apex Motor Fuel v. Barrett, 20 Ill. 2d 395, 169 N.E.2d 769
(1960).
21. For a discussion of these remedies as they relate to the contestation of real estate assessments, see text accompanying notes 26-40 infra.
22. The court's comparison of the wording of each constitution
stated:
Section 1 of article IX of the Constitution of 1870 provided:
'The general assembly shall provide such revenue as may be needful
by levying a tax, by valuation, so that every person and corporation
shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, or its property
-such value to be ascertained by some person or persons, to be
elected or appointed in such manner as the general assembly shall
direct, and not otherwise; * * * ' (Emphasis added.)
Section 4(a) of article IX of the Constitution of 1970 provides:
'Except as otherwise provided in this Section, taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly by valuation ascertained as the General Assembly shall provide by law.' (Emphasis added.)
57 Ill. 2d at 329, 312 N.E.2d at 258.

23. Id. at 329-30, 312 N.E.2d at 258.
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statements made on the convention floor 24 which Wattling
firmly believed established a new standard of judicial review,
were cited by the court as being in direct support of the LaSalle
Bank decision:
The constitutional debates contain only slight reference to the
subject of judicial review of assessments. Delegate Karns, who
had submitted the proposed amendment, was asked if he would
be amenable to the insertion of some phrase or clause in his
amendment which would make judicial
review more likely.
25
Delegate Karns indicated he would not.
Thus, in view of the uncertainty of the framers of the
constitution and despite the predictions of the legal scholars, the
court reaffirmed its earlier reliance upon the theory of real and
constructive fraud as the only remedy for over-evaluation. The
hopes for expanded judicial review of administrative assessment
procedures were shattered by the holding of the LaSalle Bank
decision.
THE RIGHT TO EQUITABLE RELIEF
In the 1930's, the Illinois legislature enacted the predecessors
to what are now sections 675 and 716 of the revenue chapter. 26
These sections require that in order to contest any tax assessment, the taxpayer is required to pay the entire tax to the
appropriate collector, and then file timely objections with the
circuit court for review and possible refund.2 T The shortcomings and potential hardship involved with this form of assessment protest are readily apparent. Illinois courts have consistently held that, in all but the most extreme cases, these statutes provide the taxpayer with an adequate remedy at law in
contesting the actions of the assessor.2 8 Thus, the courts have
found this method to provide adequate legal relief, and as a result
the taxpayer is severely limited in invoking the jurisdiction of
equity.
24. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
25. 57 Ill. 2d at 329, 312 N.E.2d at 258.
26. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 675, 716 (1973).
27. In pertinent part, section 675 provides:
If any person desires to object . . . to all or any of a real property
tax for any year, for any reason other than that the real estate is
not subject to taxation, he shall first pay all of the tax installment
due....
The validity of the statute was upheld in Lakefront Realty Corp. v.
Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 167 N.E.2d 236 (1960). For a discussion of the use
and procedures of the payment under protest provisions, see Parham,
Procedures for Obtaining Relief with Respect to Property Tax Assessments and Rates, 61 ILL. B.J. 306 (1973); and Mathias, Paid Under Protest, 58 ILL. B.J. 466 (1970).
28. Lakefront Realty v. Lorenz, 19 Ill. 2d 415, 167 N.E.2d 236 (1960);
Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage Dist., 4 Ill. 2d 72, 122 N.E.2d 257 (1954);
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Tierney, 411 Ill. 421, 104 N.E.2d 222
(1952); Ames v. Schlaeger, 386 Ill. 160, 53 N.E.2d 937 (1944).
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The obvious limitations of these remedies at law created
pressure on the legal community to seek an alternative form of
relief in real estate litigation. Although somewhat limited, equity
did provide some relief in specific types of cases.
A taxpayer need not look to the remedy at law but may seek
relief by way of injunction where the tax is unauthorized by law
or where it is levied upon property exempt from taxation. These
two situations constitute independent ground for equitable relief
and in such cases it is not necessary that the remedy at law be
29
inadequate.
The reason that equitable relief, as well as statutory legal relief,
is available in cases of unauthorized taxes and exempt properties
is because no question exists as to valuation. If the property
is exempt or if the tax assessed is illegal, nothing is due to the
county, and the property should not be exposed to loss at a tax
sale.8 0
Historically, the chancery courts had granted injunctions
where the prior statute had made no provisions for refunds on
excessive valuations. 31 When the General Assembly enacted the
payment under protest statutes and provided for court-enforced
refunds for excessive valuation, the principal argument for
injunctive relief disappeared. The injunctive procedure had
acted only to slow the collection of revenue. Dicta in recent
cases had hinted that equitable relief might be invoked in cases
where the valutation was so excessive as to connote constructive
fraud.3 2 However, in the case of Clarendon Associates v.
Korzen,3 3 the Illinois Supreme Court held that excessive valuation, in itself, would not be sufficient to invoke equitable jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in Clarendon asserted that the assessments of their properties were so excessive as to be fraudulent,
and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Without setting
out the facts of the case, the court found that the parties had
an adequate remedy at law through the procedures of payment
under protest.
The Clarendon court expressed concern that a serious crisis
in the collection of revenue could occur should injunctive relief
29. Clarendon Associates v. Korzen, 56 Ill. 2d 101, 105, 306 N.E.2d 299,
301 (1973).
30. Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage Dist., 4 Ill. 2d 72, 122 N.E.2d 257
(1954); Owens-Illinois Glass Co. v. McKibben, 385 Ill. 245, 52 N.E.2d 177
(1943); Moline Water Power Co. v. Cox, 252 Ill. 248, 96 N.E. 1044 (1911).
The taxpayer may elect to pursue either a legal or an equitable
remedy in these two specific instances. Sanitary Dist. v. Young, 285 Ill.
351, 120 N.E. 818 (1918).
31. Ames v. Schlaeger, 386 Ill. 160, 53 N.E.2d 937 (1944); Peoples Gas
Light and Coke Co. v. Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164, 121 N.E. 629 (1918); Pacific
Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 83 Ill. 602 (1876).
32. See, e.g., American College of Surgeons v. Korzen, 36 Ill. 2d 340,
224 N.E.2d 7 (1967).
33. 56 Ill, 2d 101, 306 N.E.2d 299 (1973).
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be freely available.3 4 Perhaps the court was sagacious in that
it foresaw today's depressed economic condition where litigation
might be used to forestall payment of contested taxes. Such a
situation could paralyze local governments with their heavy
dependence upon the revenue of real property taxes.
The court then defined the question even more concisely. If
the taxpayer is able to pay the assessed tax and subsequently
sue to obtain a refund, such relief would be equivalent to that
granted by equity. The plaintiffs had paid the tax in full, and
thus established the adequacy of their remedy at law. The court
thus eliminated equity as a concurrent remedy for excessive
valuations. If the taxpayer is able to pay under protest, he must
meet an extremely heavy burden in order to have recourse to
equity. In effect the court has stated that equity is not totally
precluded as a remedy. However, plaintiffs will be forced to
make a special showing of extrinsic evidence in order to be
entitled to equitable relief. The door to equity has not been completely closed, as the court stated:
Although there may have been justification for granting
injunctive relief in constructively fraudulent assessment cases
prior to [the enactment of the payment under protest statutes],
we do not think this should continue to be considered as an independent ground for equitable relief.
There will be cases of fraudulently excessive assessments
where the remedy at law will3 5 not be adequate and injunctive
relief should then be available.
Hoyne Savings & Loan Association v. Hare" indicates what
the court regards as a proper case for equity, thereby lessening
the uncertainty of Clarendon to some extent. The plaintiff savings and loan subdivided a tract of land and made minor
improvements. The defendant assessor raised the 1970 valuation
of the property from $9,500 to $246,810, with a correlative increase
in the tax computation. Hoyne was not aware of this change
until it received the new tax bill, although the assessor had published the new assessment rolls. Defendant assessor sought to
bar Hoyne's right to equitable relief, contending that the plaintiff
had an adequate remedy at law. Hoyne, unaware of the changed
assessment figure, failed to appeal to the Board of Review. This
failure to exhaust its administrative remedy barred recourse at
34. The court cited People ex rel. Sweitzer v. Orrington Co., 360 111.
289, 195 N.E. 642 (1935) to emphasize this factor. That court found that

taxpayers of a depression era were filing needless and groundless objections to tax assessments, thereby severely impairing the functions of local
governments.
35. 56 Ill. 2d at 107-08, 306 N.E.2d at 302-03.
36. 60 Ill. 2d 84, 322 N.E.2d 833 (1974).
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Pursuant to a lower court order, plaintiff paid the tax

due under the assessment into court pending a hearing.
Clarendon fairly implied that where a taxpayer was able to
pay the assessment under protest, equitable relief was not available. However, Hoyne was found to fit into that small category
of cases wherein the Clarendon court had hinted that the possibility of injunctive relief was not precluded.
[I]n Clarendon,we also stated: 'There will be cases of fraudulently excessive assessments where the remedy at law will not
be adequate and injunctive relief should then be available.' . . .
We consider this case . . . to fall within this exception to the

general rule announced in Clarendon.38
The court looked into a number of factors concerning the assessment process and its propriety in relation to this case. Among
the most important of these included:
1) An increased valuation of approximately 2500% on property
without significant improvement.
2) An assessment based upon the best possible use of the land,
when at the time of the assessment, such a use was prohibited
by the local zoning ordinance.
3) Consideration of all lots in the sub-division as improved,
although fewer than 10% actually were so improved.
4) The fact that plaintiff's taxes for subsequent years had
been significantly reduced, which the court construed as acknowledgment that the contested taxes were grossly excessive.
5) A figure from a private appraiser of only 10% of the county's
assessed valuation.
While the court found no single factor sufficient to warrant
equitable relief, these many unwarranted factors in the aggregate
prompted a finding that:
Under these circumstances it would be extremely unfair and
unjust for this court to adhere to a rigid formula which would
require that all relief from fraudulently excessive assessments
be sought through the legal remedy provided by statute. This
is a proceeding in equity, and a court of equity is not bound by
strict formulas ... but may shape its remedy 39to meet the

demands of justice in every case, however peculiar.
The Clarendonand Hoyne decisions imply that the possibility
of equitable relief will be decided on a case by case basis. While
Clarendon has stated that excessive assessments alone will not
37. Payment under protest must be accompanied by timely filed objections. Where the taxpayer fails to file proper written objections

within the statutory period, he waives his right to protest. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 120, § 716 (1973).
38. 60 Ill. 2d at 89, 322 N.E.2d at 836.
39. Id. at 90-91, 322 N.E.2d at 837 (citation omitted).
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be sufficient to invoke equity, Hoyne appears to hold that an
assessment which is admittedly "grossly excessive," accompanied
by various other factors, will enable an equitable remedy. 40 A
critical factor in both cases is the ability of the plaintiffs to pay
the contested sum into court pursuant to the statutory remedy.
As of yet, no Illinois court has decided the adequacy of the legal
remedy where the contestant makes a showing of inability to
pay as mandated by the statutes. 41 However, it will become
readily apparent that the issue must be resolved within a
reasonably short time.
FEDERAL REVIEW OF PROPERTY TAX ASSESSMENTS

Long before the enactment of applicable statutes, the federal
courts expressed extreme reluctance in affording state taxpayers
equitable relief on federal grounds where state procedures provided an adequate remedy wherein the taxpayer could assert
deficiencies in federal constitutional standards. 42 The rationale
for such a judicial attitude was founded upon a feeling that
enjoining the collection of state taxes constituted an unwarranted interference with a state's internal economic and administrative procedures. 43 This concept of judicial restraint was
granted congressional approval and sanction with the enactment
of the predecessors of 28 U.S.C. § 1341. 4 4 In 1948, § 1341 was
enacted into law in the same form in which it exists today:
40. The Hoyne court noted:
Although not intending to establish a line of demarcation as to when
an assessment will be so excessive as to render the relief at law inadequate, we consider this grossly excessive assessment significant
though not necessarily by itself controlling.
Additional circumstances which assist us in the formation of the
total picture requiring equitable intervention are the extremely late
date on which the assessor completed the assessments .

. .,

the publi-

cation date, which was several months later than ordinarily expected, the late mailing of the tax bills, and the fact that the first
actual notice which the plaintiff had of the increased assessment was
after the Board of Review had closed its books for the 1971 taxes.
Of substantial significance is the revelation made to this court
[that] it appears that the assessing officials of McHenry County
have acknowledged that the assessment on which the plaintiff's taxes
for 1971 was based was grossly excessive.
Id. at 89-90, 322 N.E.2d at 836.
41. See the discussion of Exchange National Bank v. Cullerton, 17
Ill. App. 3d 392, 308 N.E.2d 284 (1974), at note 53 infra.
42. Matthews v. Rogers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932); Stratton v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 530 (1932).
43. See Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293
(1943).
44. An Act of August 21, 1937, ch. 726, § 1, 50 Stat. 738. The original
statute essentially provided that federal relief was not available to a
state taxpayer where the state could demonstrate the existence of an adequate remedy at law. The language has been adopted for the most part
in the current statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
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The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend, or restrain the
assessment, levy, or collection of any tax under state law where
a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had in the courts
of such state.
With the enactment of this statute, Congress placed the burden
upon the taxpayer to follow the required state procedures before
resort to the federal courts will be permitted. 45 State procedures must be followed even though there may be substantial
4
federal issues raised by the taxpayer. "
Court interpretation of this section has shown that the
phrase "plain, speedy, and efficient" will generally receive a liberal interpretation. The standard involved has been held to
connote that the state remedy need not be the "plainest, speediest, or most efficient remedy. ' 4 7 Similarly, federal declaratory
relief has been held to be unavailable until state remedies have
been exhausted. 4" As so interpreted, the statute has created a
heavy burden upon the state taxpayer in contesting a state tax
in federal courts. Where state law provides for an appellate
process of some form, it will be unlikely that the taxpayer will
be entitled to federal redress of a matter related to state taxation.

49

The recent case of 28 East Jackson Enterprises, Inc. v.
Cullerton50 tested the availability of the federal courts as an
alternative forum for contesting the valuation of real property
in Illinois. Plaintiff-taxpayer failed to pay the tax levied on
51
its property following an allegedly fraudulent assessment.
The taxpayer sought no state remedy, but filed a civil rights suit
against the assessor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.52 Petitioner's
45. Geo. F. Alger Co. v. Peck, 74 S. Ct. 605 (1954) (Reed, J., as Circuit Justice).
46. See Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974); cf. Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969).
47. Mandel v. Hutchinson, 494 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974); Ford Motor
Credit Co. v. Louisiana Tax Comm'n, 321 F. Supp. 1365 (E.D. La. 1971).
48. . . . [W]e are of the opinion that those considerations which
have led federal courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection
of state taxes, save in exceptional cases, require a !ike restraint in
the use of the declaratory judgment procedure.
Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 299 (1943).
See also Hickmann v. Wujick, 488 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1973); City of Houston v. Standard-Triumph Motor Co., 347 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1965).
49. See, e.g., McCaw v. Fase, 216 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 927 (1955).
50. Dock. #74-1179 (7th Cir., Aug.8,1975).
51. Plaintiff alleged that its property was assessed at 70% of its fair
market value, while Cook County generally assessed its property at 25%
of its fair market value. Id. at 2.
52. Section 1983 reads, in its totality:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
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substantive argument was that the disparity of the assessment
of its property in comparison with that of neighboring property
was so great as to cause a denial of due process and equal
protection.
The jurisdictional allegation essentially stated that, due to
plaintiff's inability to pay the tax under protest as mandated by
the Illinois statutes, there was no adequate remedy at law in
the state courts. The allegation was necessary to preserve jurisdiction in the face of § 1341. The district court granted the preliminary injunctive relief after finding that plaintiff's inability
to pay under protest denied it a remedy which was "plain, speedy,
and efficient."
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Cullerton, the Cook
County Assessor, argued that payment under protest was a
remedy sufficient to preclude federal jurisdiction over the dispute. The Court of Appeals answered this response by ruling
that, since the district court had expressly found that plaintiffs
were unable to pay the tax under protest, such a remedy was
not available to the taxpayer. Defendant-assessor then claimed
that the taxpayer could, under the circumstances, seek equitable
relief in the Illinois courts. The taxpayer's response to this was
that such a remedy had been foreclosed by the Clarendon decision, and that there was no remedy under the state plan which
would provide relief for the taxpayer's constructively fraudulent
assessment.
The majority opinion reversed the district court and dissolved the injunction. Essential to the decision was the court's
reliance on the Clarendon language to the effect that while constructive fraud alone would not suffice to invoke equitable relief,
other factors could enter which might permit a state court to
invoke its equity jurisdiction. 53 The court stated that the policy
of freely allowing equitable relief would "impair the collection
of state revenues and undermine the purpose of the statutory
remedy. ' 54 However, the court found that the plaintiff in this
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
53. The Seventh Circuit favorably cited both Hoyne and LaSalle

Bank as authority for this hypothesis. The court also cited Exchange
National Bank v. Cullerton, 17 Ill. App. 3d 392, 308 N.E.2d 284 (1974).

In this case, the dicta of the Illinois Appellate Court implied that, had

plaintiff been able to satisfactorily establish inability to make the payment under protest, equitable relief may have been granted. However,
such a showing had not been attempted by the plaintiff. Taxpayer had
attacked the payment under protest statutes as a violation of constitutional due process. The dismissal by the lower court of plaintiff's action
was upheld by the appellate court.
54. 28 East Jackson at 4. The court found that this factor was a valid
policy for the limitation placed on equitable remedies by the state courts,

but that the strength of the policy could not be used to totally preclude
any resort to equity.
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case did not seek equity to delay payment, but sought its relief
only because no other was available to it. In effect, the Seventh
Circuit expressed its faith that the state courts would construe
both Clarendon and Hoyne as allowing equitable relief in the
plaintiffs situation.
Since the legal remedy considered adequate in Clarendon was
the statutory remedy of payment under protest, it follows that
when that remedy is unavailable, as in the present case, an
action for injunction will lie ....

[W]e believe that it is rea-

sonably certain that Illinois courts would entertain a suit for
injunction when a taxpayer establishes that he lacks the funds
to comply with the statutory remedy of payment under protest.
Under such circumstances, the principles of comity and restraint
embodied in section 1341 require that plaintiff first seek equitable relief in the Illinois court.65
A dissenting opinion felt that the likelihood of equitable
relief in the state courts was not so certain as to deprive the
federal courts of jurisdiction. Section 1341 will not apply when
the existence or adequacy of the state remedy is uncertain. 56
The dissent argued that, as the majority's reliance on Clarendon
and Hoyne was mere prediction, the requisite "certainty" was
not so imminent as to deprive the plaintiff of a federal forum
under § 1341. While agreeing with the majority that the injunction should have been dissolved, the dissent recommended that
the district court be allowed to retain jurisdiction of the case
pending the state court's disposition of the taxpayer's suit.
The implication left by the Seventh Circuit was unmistakable. The failure of the state courts to permit equitable relief
would permit the taxpayer to return and plead his case in the
federal courts. The federal judiciary has sent a subtle message
to the state courts: should the Clarendon doctrine fail to allow
sufficient exceptions to fulfill the federal standards, federal
review of the state's assessment procedures may well follow.
Nonetheless, the federal court denied access to this taxpayer until
state remedies were exhausted, perhaps giving the state courts
a further push to reassess the Clarendon exceptions and produce
additional guidelines. It must be noted that, pending resolution
of any potential state-federal conflict, a taxpayer's election to
proceed in federal court without exhausting both state legal and
equitable remedies could well be an expensive one.
CLASSIFICATION OF REAL PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF TAXATION

Prior to the adoption of the new constitution, the Cook
County Assessor had long followed a system of taxation based
55. Id. at 4-5.
56. Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946).
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upon classifying different types and uses of real estate at varying percentages of market value. As the 1870 Constitution
required uniform valuation of all real property for tax purposes,
the assessor's actions were directly in contravention of the constitution. The assessor had never been successfully challenged
on this procedure. However, legal scholars and convention delegates alike acknowledged the existence of the practice. 5 7 The
term "de facto classification" has been attached to this practice. 58
Against this background, it was to be expected that the
constitutional convention would treat the problem of classification as well as the de facto actions of the assessor. An early
proposal of the Committee on Revenue and Finance recommended the abolition of mandatory uniform assessments for the
following reasons:
The basic provisions of the present revenue article...
were intended to insure that a uniform . . . property tax would
be the principal form of taxation ....
Most property was ...
easily located and easily valued.
Today, conditions are far different. Property ownership
interests are complex. Much property is intangible, some property is highly mobile and some is very difficult to value ...
In response to these factors, the property tax has become something far different from the ideal set forth in the 1870 Constitu59
tion.
The doctrine of classification was eventually granted constitutional legitimacy. 60 The phrase "may classify or continue to
classify" was inserted to bridge the gap between the old and new
constitutions, and to retroactively legitimize the past classification of the Cook County Assessor. However, debates ensued as
to whether the language of the article was self-enacting or
required enabling legislation.
Wattling had feared that under the new constitution the
continuing de facto classification by the assessor without the
57. See Wattling, Taxation of Real Property in Illinois-The "Railroad Cases" and the Future of De Facto Classification, 1 J. MAR. J. 213
(1968). See also the discussion of the delegates to the convention con-

cerning the de facto classification in Cook County.

Verbatim Tran-

scripts, vol. III at 1989-97 (1970). The discussion generally portrays a
large conflict of ideals among the delegates, ranging from veritable outrage (remarks of Delegate Friedrich at 1991), to suspicion (remarks of

Delegate Garrison at 1994), to justification (remarks of Delegate Lyons
at 1991-92).
58. A student author has succinctly defined such classification as "a
means of applying different tax rates to different types of property."
Comment, Real Property Taxation In Illinois, 1974 U. ILL. L. FOR. 480,

490.

59. Proceedings of the Illinois Constitutional Convention, RECORD OF
SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, Comm. Proposals,

PROCEEDINGS,

vol. VII at 2113-14 (1970).
60. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(b). For the complete text of the section
see note 12 supra.
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passage of the appropriate ordinance by the County Board would
lead to a legal challenge to the entire system of real estate taxation. This challenge could, in turn, result in the collapse of real
estate taxation in Cook County:
It would appear . . . that the Cook County Board, having

failed to exercise the options granted to it under subsection 4(b)
of the Revenue Article .

.

. would be governed by the general

provisions of subsection 4(d) prohibiting the classification of real
property for purposes of taxation. It would further appear that
the changes in the classification system made by the County
Assessor in 1972 were made without legal authority and are
therefore void. 61

Two separate lawsuits embraced the legal theories of
Wattling and attacked the system of real estate taxation in Cook
County. Fortunately for the revenue and citizens of the county,
the Illinois Supreme Court rejected these challenges to the now
allegedly de jure classification. In both LaSalle National Bank
03
v. County of Cook6 2 and People ex rel. Kutner v. Cullerton,
the court ruled in favor of the classifications as they were then
being applied.
The LaSalle case was a consolidation of a number of
lawsuits and served as a massive attack on the entire revenue
system of Cook County. As to classification, the plaintiff contended that the system invoked by the assessor was without the
requisite authorization of the County Board, thus rendering all
assessments void. This contention confirmed the fears of Wattling by attacking the system in its entirety.
Upon an in depth review of the convention proceedings, the
court concluded that the framers of the Revenue Article specifically sought to allow the Cook County Assessor to continue
classification until either the General Assembly or the County
Board had acted.6 4 The court noted that several amendments
to the Revenue Article, which would have required prior action
by the County Board, had been defeated, 6 5 and construed this
in conjunction with the actual language of the constitution as
an intention on the part of the framers' to allow the classification to continue without further legislative enactments. The
holding thus found the challenge to be without a constitutional
basis. Classification by the Cook County Assessor was therefore
legitimized.
61.

WATTLING at

117.

62. 57 Ill. 2d 318, 312 N.E.2d 252 (1974). For a review of the effect
and holding of the LaSalle case on the availability of judicial review
in assessment cases, see text accompanying notes 18-25 supra.
63. 58 Ill. 2d 266, 319 N.E.2d 55 (1974).
64. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1991-97 (1969).
65. Id. at 1995-98.
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The court responded to a second challenge to classification
in the Kutner case several months after the LaSalle holding.
Plaintiff sued a number of county officials alleging that they
had failed to perform their duties to assess and equalize real
property at a uniform percentage of cash value. 6 The argument stated that not only did the assessor lack the authority
to classify property without legislative enablement, but also that
all past assessments were illegal, as the constitution was not
intended to be retroactive. Plaintiff's first contention, that the
assessor needed enabling legislation to classify property, was
found to have been resolved in the LaSalle case, and the court
quickly dismissed it.
In finding that the phrase "continue to classify" was intended to apply retroactively, the court cited the language of
several delegates upon the convention floor:
MR. GERTZ:

. . . I'd like to ask you what would be the effect

if the proposed section 4.1 were adopted? Would that, in your
opinion, fully legalize retroactively what Cook County has done?
MR. McCRACKEN: Yes, it would in my opinion.6 7
Thus, the court held that the new provision was meant to have
a retroactive effect and, as such, was able to cure the allegedly
illegal practice that preceeded the new constitution. A practice
which had been clearly unconstitutional became legitimized by
the new constitutional provision.
The court then quickly disposed of plaintiff's contention that
classification violated the equal protection clause of both the
Illinois and United States Constitutions. The court noted the
United States Supreme Court had granted the states "a very wide
discretion in the laying of their taxes,"68 and that "[t]he
presumption of constitutionality which accompanies a State's
scheme of taxation may be overcome only by a clear showing
that it is arbitrary and unsupportable by any set of facts." 69
The court concluded that plaintiff had not met this burden in
his allegations.
After many years of pursuing an illegal method of valuational assessment, the Assessor of Cook County, and all other
counties having 200,000 or more inhabitants, are free to classify
66. The cause of action was brought under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120,
§ 804 (1973), which allows a civil action for damages caused by the neglect or evasion of duty by a county clerk, assessor, or other official as
described in the statute. Plaintiff alleged that the failure to assess real
property at an equalized valuation had caused damages to the amount
of $420,000,000. As the statute authorized double recovery, the suit was
brought for $840,000,000.
67. Verbatim Transcripts,vol. III at 1995.
68. Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-27 (1959).
69. 58 Ill. 2d at 273, 319 N.E.2d at 59. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309

U.S. 83 (1940).
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property for such assessments. The holdings of both LaSalle and
Kutner clearly establish the legality of a reasonable and uniformly applied system of categorizing property for tax purposes.
The issue seems closed, as the Illinois General Assembly has
passed enabling legislation, as has the Cook County Board of
70

Commissioners.

CONCLUSION

Providing fair and equitable treatment for taxpayers in a
modern and urban society is extremely complex. It is filled with
conflicts between real estate investors and individual homeowners. The power of industrial taxpayers conflicts with efforts
to accommodate the needs of single family taxpayers. The
economic power of wealthy urban developers conflicts with
government programs to provide adequate housing.
These conflicting interests and the increasing revenue needs
of local governments place a great strain on the revenue system
of a state or municipality. The pressure becomes even greater
when, despite the heavy dependence upon real estate taxes, there
exists an increasing inability to collect these taxes in areas of
decline. The system is further distorted by an assessment
mechanism which has been admittedly political and criticized as
arbitrary and corrupt. The judiciary, faced with these conflicts
and administrative deficiencies, appears to be unwilling to be
dragged into the morass of direct review of specific assessments.
The cases decided since the adoption of the Constitution of
1970 indicate that the state courts will exercise restraint in any
efforts to widen their appellate jurisdiction of the assessment
process. Under a clearly legal doctrine, the judiciary has committed itself to support governmental operations by means of a
continued and uninterrupted flow of revenue. Although the Illinois Supreme Court, as well as the applicable federal courts, may
be criticized for its unwillingness to enter this "thicket," it is
apparent that the court has begun to outline a path which clarifies the availability of taxpayer relief. It may be argued that
the court has not followed, with great acumen, the implicit
mandates of the new constitutional provisions. It may be additionally argued that the court has not reached a fully fair and
equitable system from the taxpayers' standpoint. Nevertheless,
the aggrieved taxpayer is now more fully aware of what rights
are available to him should he seek relief from the courts.
Although much remains to be resolved, the court appears to have
made an adequate start in defining the procedures available to
the property owner.
70. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 501 (Supp. 1975).

